Legislature(2015 - 2016)HOUSE FINANCE 519
10/25/2015 03:00 PM House FINANCE
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB3001 | |
| Presentation: Transcanada's Aklng Participation | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | HB3001 | TELECONFERENCED | |
HOUSE FINANCE COMMITTEE
THIRD SPECIAL SESSION
October 25, 2015
3:10 p.m.
3:10:03 PM
CALL TO ORDER
Co-Chair Neuman called the House Finance Committee meeting
to order at 3:10 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Mark Neuman, Co-Chair
Representative Steve Thompson, Co-Chair
Representative Dan Saddler, Vice-Chair
Representative Bryce Edgmon
Representative Les Gara
Representative Lynn Gattis
Representative David Guttenberg
Representative Scott Kawasaki
Representative Cathy Munoz
Representative Tammie Wilson
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Lance Pruitt
ALSO PRESENT
Marty Rutherford, Deputy Commissioner, Department of
Natural Resources; Deepa Poduval, Principle Consultant,
Black and Veatch; Mark Myers, Commissioner, Department of
Natural Resources; Representative Jim Colver;
Representative Dave Talerico; Representative Dan Ortiz;
Representative Liz Vazquez; Representative Lora Reinbold;
Representative Cathy Tilton; Representative Andy Josephson;
Representative Neil Foster; Representative Louise Stutes;
Representative Shelley Hughes; Representative Paul Seaton;
Representative Bob Herron; Representative Chris Tuck;
Representative Bob Lynn; Representative Geran Tarr;
Representative Sam Kito III; Representative Gabriel LeDoux;
Representative Mike Chenault.
SUMMARY
HB 3001 APPROP: LNG PROJECT & FUND/AGDC/SUPP.
HB 3001 was HEARD and HELD in committee for
further consideration.
PRESENTATION: TRANSCANADA'S AKLNG PARTICIPATION
3:10:16 PM
Co-Chair Neuman reviewed the agenda for the day. He
communicated that the department was working on committee
questions from the previous day and would provide them at a
later time.
House Bill No. 3001
"An Act making supplemental appropriations; making
appropriations to capitalize funds; making
appropriations to the general fund from the budget
reserve fund (art. IX, sec. 17, Constitution of the
State of Alaska) in accordance with sec. 12(c), ch. 1,
SSSLA 2015; and providing for an effective date."
3:12:22 PM
^PRESENTATION: TRANSCANADA'S AKLNG PARTICIPATION
3:12:22 PM
MARTY RUTHERFORD, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, introduced herself.
DEEPA PODUVAL, PRINCIPLE CONSULTANT, BLACK AND VEATCH,
introduced herself. She communicated that Black and Veatch
was involved in large infrastructure projects around the
world with a focus on energy, water, telecommunications,
and critical human infrastructure. She relayed that her
area of expertise was in midstream natural gas and liquid
natural gas (LNG). She had worked on contract for the state
for the past ten years, beginning with SGDA [Stranded Gas
Development Act] through AGIA [Alaska Gasline Inducement
Act], and SB 138 [legislation passed in 2014 related to a
gas pipeline, AGDC, and oil and gas production tax].
Co-Chair Neuman noted that the committee would address the
presentation the following day as well.
Ms. Rutherford introduced a PowerPoint presentation titled
"TransCanada's AKLNG Participation" dated October 25, 2015
(copy on file). She read from slide 2: "Executive Summary":
Background
· In June 2014, the State of Alaska (SOA) and
TransCanada Alaska Midstream LP (TransCanada) entered
into a key agreement authorizing TransCanada to pay
the upfront capital costs and hold the State's 25
percent share of ownership in the midstream components
of the Alaska LNG (AKLNG) Project. These midstream
components are the Gas Treatment Plant (GTP) and
pipeline portions of the overall project.
· The agreement, called the Precedent Agreement (PA),
was based on terms of a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the State and TransCanada signed in
December 2013. While the Alaska Legislature was not a
party to the PA, it reviewed and debated the terms of
the MOU during the 2014 legislative session.
Decision at Hand
· The State is now faced with a December 31, 2015
deadline to make a decision on whether to take back
TransCanada's share and have direct equity
participation in the AKLNG midstream. To do so would
require termination of the PA.
· Under the PA's terms, by December 31, 2015, the State
is obligated to either enter into a Firm
Transportation Services Agreement (FTSA) with
TransCanada or TC will be able to terminate the PA.
Alternatively, if agreeable to TransCanada, the State
can negotiate to extend the date for entering into an
FTSA beyond December 2015.
Recommendation
· The State administration recommends termination of the
TransCanada relationship by December 2015 and
replacing it with the State's direct participation in
the AKLNG midstream.
· The State administration expects this path to allow
the State to better manage the obligation the State
has for AKLNG midstream costs whether or not the
project proceeds, increase the overall economics of
the project to the State, and allow the State to have
more direct voting rights on key AKLNG issues in
return for its investment.
3:16:20 PM
Co-Chair Neuman asked for verification that the
presentation would include backup information
substantiating the points in the executive summary [slide
2]. Ms. Rutherford responded affirmatively.
Ms. Rutherford read from slide 4 titled "Context for
State's 2014 decision to enter into a Precedent Agreement
(PA) with TransCanada (TC)":
AGIA framework:
· TransCanada was the State's licensee under AGIA
· AGIA work product could not be transferred to AKLNG
until after resolution of AGIA abandonment issues
(including cost of the work product)
· AGIA also contained a treble damages provision
· It was in this context that the prior Administration
negotiated an MOU with TC in 2013, and the AGIA
Termination Agreement in 2014, to exit AGIA,
transition to AKLNG, and sign the PA with TC
Entering into the PA with TC
· Gave the State a clean off ramp from the TC
relationship, now, which it did not have when it
entered into the PA for all the reasons discussed
above
· Gave the State time during pre
develop its in
consider the option of participating directly in
midstream at appropriate off
· TC's work on AGIA and APP allowed smooth transition
into pre
· Entering into the PA with TC for pre
the State time to assess its ability to finance its
share of investment in AKLNG without TransCanada
3:19:02 PM
Ms. Rutherford read from slide 5 titled "Key terms of the
Precedent Agreement between State of Alaska and
TransCanada":
· TC Owns the State's ~25% Entitlement to GTP +
Pipeline
· Funds up front midstream cash calls Technical lead
for pipeline during pre-FEED
· State to Commit to 20-25 Year Transportation
Agreement with
· TC by Dec 2015 to Pay for Using GTP+Pipe
· SOA Ultimately pays TC for all its Costs (including
a cost of capital of ~7%)
· Both SOA and TC have Milestones & Off Ramps: SOA
Responsible for TC Costs, Regardless of Off Ramps
Ms. Rutherford elaborated that the state was always
responsible for the TransCanada costs regardless of off-
ramps. She noted that later in the presentation Ms. Poduval
would address how the state would pay for each of the
responsibilities.
Ms. Rutherford highlighted that the PA had agreed upon off-
ramps that allowed the state to terminate before December
31, 2015 (slide 6). The first off-ramp occurred by the end
of 2015 and required a termination of the PA by December
31. At that point the state would be obligated to pay
TransCanada development costs of approximately $70 million,
which included TransCanada internal costs. The second off-
ramp occurred between the FEED [Front End Engineering and
Design] stage and the final investment decision [FID],
which was set to occur approximately by the end of December
2018. She detailed that the cost of buying out TransCanada
at that point was estimated at around $490 million (the
amount would include TransCanada's internal costs).
Ms. Rutherford moved to slide 8 and relayed that the state
was faced with the critical decision on whether to
terminate the PA with TransCanada. She explained that the
state had two options:
1. Terminate the PA by December 31, 2015
State would have to reimburse TransCanada for its
costs incurred to date (plus approximately 7 percent
interest) - SOA increases overall equity and voting
rights to 25 percent, which equals the SOA's share of
gas
2. Or, assuming TC is willing, Execute an FTSA with
TransCanada by December 31, 2015
TransCanada would continue to incur costs on behalf of
the SOA unless there is a termination at a later date,
at which point the SOA will have to reimburse
TransCanada's costs (plus approximately 7 percent
interest)
3:23:04 PM
Ms. Rutherford read from slide 9: "The administration
recommends Termination of the Precedent Agreement":
Alignment
Currently, the SOA is estimated to receive 25% of the
gas from Project; however, with TransCanada's equity
participation in the midstream portion of the Project,
the SOA only retains approximately 12.5% equity in the
project
Voting Rights
Terminating the agreement and increasing the State's
voting rights would allow the State to have a more
direct say in the decision making process of the
project
Ms. Rutherford elaborated that ensuring that the state had
a more direct say in project decision making was
particularly important as the project moved from pre-FEED
to FEED. She continued to read from slide 9:
Economic Benefit
The SOA could realize up to $400 million of additional
annual net cash flows from the Project, based on DOR's
expectations of State being able to finance cheaper
than TC by financing the midstream portion of the
Project directly
Ms. Rutherford noted that consultants Lazard, Greengate
LLC, and FirstSouthwest, had all spoken on the topic the
previous day. She relayed that she and Ms. Poduval would
continue to address the topic throughout the presentation.
She turned the presentation over to Ms. Poduval.
Ms. Poduval stated that the main drivers behind the
administration's recommendation were to improve alignment,
increase the state's voting rights, and create more
economic benefit to the state.
Ms. Poduval addressed the importance of equity alignment
and voting rights on slide 11. She pointed to a schematic
showing the current project structure. She detailed that
ExxonMobil, BP, and ConocoPhillips each held a certain
share of gas, which equaled their ownership in the project.
She explained that the state was expected to get 25 percent
of the gas from the project, but because TransCanada held
the equity in the GTP and pipeline, effectively the state
only held the 25 percent equity in the LNG plant. She
furthered that because the LNG plant was expected to be
about half the cost of the total project, it meant that the
state had about 12.5 percent ownership in the AKLNG project
compared to its 25 percent ownership of the gas.
3:26:22 PM
Ms. Poduval moved to slide 12: "Alignment through direct
participation will facilitate State influence equivalent to
its investment." She explained that the state's equity
ownership in the AKLNG project would determine its voting
rights, which it was currently sharing with TransCanada.
She discussed that as a midstream infrastructure company,
TransCanada's decisions were driven by maximizing its
shareholder value. Whereas, the state's interests would
always be to maximize value for Alaskans from the
perspective of a resource owner. She explained that the
situation created a fundamental misalignment. Often, the
state and TransCanada fell on the same side of issues;
however, there were several instances where TransCanada
fell on a different side. She furthered that rather than
being an agent of the state or an extension of the state
and always voting as the state would want, TransCanada was
a commercial entity that the state had to negotiate when
the entities had differences of opinion.
Ms. Poduval relayed that one of the primary learnings in
going through the pre-FEED process with TransCanada was
understanding the challenges of the structure that had been
established. She discussed that TransCanada's role on
behalf of the state was diluting the state's voice in the
project. She stated that there were many important
decisions on the horizon including, the project budget and
schedule, design decisions (e.g. pipeline and GTP), and
decisions related to by-product handling at the GTP. She
elaborated that by-product handling held a high level of
importance to the state because a significant amount of
carbon dioxide (CO2) extracted from the gas at Prudhoe Bay,
which would require disposal. The decision would be
influenced by whoever owned the GTP; it would be important
for the state to influence the decision. She explained that
the misalignment was not from any ill intent, but was
simply a function of TransCanada being a commercial entity
working to maximize its shareholder value versus trying to
maximize the value of Alaska's resources. Additionally, it
created complexity when establishing the project governance
agreements. For example, she questioned whether TransCanada
would vote on all issues that affect the GTP and pipeline
and if the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation (AGDC)
would vote on issues that affect the LNG plant. She asked
what would occur if there was an issue affecting all three
components and who would speak for the state.
Ms. Poduval relayed that another challenge in the structure
was access of information [by the state]. She explained
that the structure did not work as efficiently as it would
if the state was directly at the table. There were
challenges for the state associated with the quality,
timing, and quantity of the information.
3:29:54 PM
Ms. Poduval addressed criteria for evaluating economic
impact of TransCanada's participation on the state (slide
14). The presentation used three different criteria to
evaluate the economics: cash flows, net present value, and
risk. She addressed cash flows, which included two
components: upfront cash calls the state would make and
operational cash flows the state would receive. She
addressed the upfront cash calls the state would be
required to make if the agreement with TransCanada was
terminated. She detailed that state would immediately be
responsible for paying back TransCanada for its investment
in pre-FEED, which was estimated at approximately $70
million; and for funding AGDC for the continuation of
TransCanada's work on pre-FEED, which was estimated at
slightly over $60 million. Going forward the state would
need to make direct upfront cash calls for FEED and project
construction.
Ms. Poduval addressed whether the economic impact to the
state was driven by a trade-off between higher upfront
investment and higher operational cash flows or lower up-
front investment with lower operational cash flows (slide
16). She explained that the fundamental tradeoff had not
changed since the last time the legislature had looked at
the TransCanada decision. She stated that the economics
worked out in the same way. She relayed that the state's
total upfront cash call exposure was $6.9 billion to $8.3
billion higher without TransCanada's participation (slide
17). The $7 billion figure was at the project's base
capital cost estimate at about $45 billion, while a 20
percent capital cost overrun at about $54 billion would
produce an upfront cash call of approximately $8 billion.
3:32:51 PM
Ms. Poduval discussed that the state's annual upfront cash
calls in the AKLNG project were expected to nearly double
without TransCanada (slide 18). She detailed that at the
peak of construction the state would have to fund about
$1.5 billion with TransCanada, which would increase to
slightly over $2.5 billion without TransCanada. She noted
that a very small amount of the project's total investment
was spent during pre-FEED (approximately 1 percent) and 4
to 5 percent of the project's total costs were spent during
FEED. She elaborated that FID would occur between FEED and
construction; 95 percent of the capital costs associated
with the project would occur after FID. She discussed that
the state's financing would come together at FID. She
expounded that each of the project partners would have to
sell their LNG under long-term commitments by that time and
line up their financing for the project. At that point
board approval would have been given, the engineering and
design would be complete, and contractors would be ready to
begin construction. Before the state took FID for the
project, it would have secured financing from the financial
market. She explained that the upfront capital calls would
be paid by the state's chosen source of debt.
Ms. Poduval highlighted that once the project became
operational the state was expected to receive annual cash
flows of up to $400 million higher without TransCanada
(slide 19). The savings estimate came from the expectation
that the state had a lower cost of debt than TransCanada's
7 percent interest rate. Additionally, the state did not
have certain cost elements that TransCanada had (e.g. in
terms of taxes).
3:35:38 PM
Ms. Poduval discussed slide 20: "NPV increase to the State
without TC can be between $0-1.2B over 20 years." She
explained that depending on the discount rate used to
calculate the net present value (NPV), the state would be
neutral at worst under a 10 percent discount rate, whereas,
under a 5 percent discount rate the state would achieve
additional value exceeding $1 billion.
Ms. Poduval discussed slide 21: "The economic benefit of
replacing TC could vary based on the SOA's credit rating."
She referred to the projection that the state could achieve
up to $400 million per year in additional net cash flows.
She explained that the $400 million was based on the
expectation that the state could finance at a lower rate on
its own versus through TransCanada. The sensitivity
analysis on slide 21 looked at what would occur if the
state's cost of capital for the project was higher than
expected. She referenced testimony from the previous day by
members of the project finance team that they believed the
state would be able to obtain financing for the project.
Additionally, the presenters had shared the expected cost
of debt at different credit ratings for the state. At an A-
rating the interest rate would be about 5.5 percent. The
$360 million bar shown on slide 21 had been rounded up to
the $400 million. She stated that even if the state's cost
of debt increased to a rate of 5 percent, there would still
be $170 million in additional value to the state without
TransCanada. She stated that even under some interest rates
that were too high to be realistic, the state would achieve
additional cash flows without TransCanada.
Ms. Poduval discussed slide 23: "Why terminate the
agreement with TransCanada now?" She relayed that the PA
had been designed to have different off-ramps for the
state. She elaborated that the agreement had been entered
into against the background of AGIA for the pre-FEED period
with the recognition that pre-FEED represented a small
portion of the project's development costs. She furthered
that pre-FEED allowed the state to examine the
effectiveness of the relationship with TransCanada and
helped the state understand whether it had the financial
ability to invest directly in the midstream. The different
off-ramps at the end of pre-FEED and through FEED had been
designed to allow the state to come to the fork in road,
evaluate the information based on the pre-FEED experience,
and understand whether an off-ramp was the right decision
for the state. She relayed that the administration was
recommending the current off-ramp based on the state's
ability to manage financial risk, to avoid back-in rights,
and to influence project decisions.
3:39:26 PM
Ms. Poduval addressed the state's ability to manage
financial risk on slide 24. She relayed that the state was
obligated to repay TransCanada's costs if during the
development stage, the state terminated TransCanada,
TransCanada exited the project, or the project was
terminated. TransCanada's costs included development and
internal costs and a 7 percent interest on the amounts. She
continued that if the state could secure lower financing
rates on its own, the earlier it made the termination
decision, the lower its ultimate costs would be in the
event of a failure. Currently there was a prospect of a
successful project, which created a much better environment
for the state to secure financing in. She explained that if
in three years the project was not moving forward,
TransCanada would have invested much more on the state's
behalf and would have accrued many more internal costs as
well as interest expenses. She continued that the state
would have the obligation of writing a larger check to
TransCanada, potentially with very little notice, and would
need to then go to the financing community to fund the
debt. At that point the financing community would know that
the state's prospects of a successful project had dimmed
significantly. She relayed that under the scenario the
state's financing costs were expected to be higher.
Ms. Poduval discussed a scenario that included a successful
project that included TransCanada. She detailed that the
state would be obligated to repay all of TransCanada's
costs in the form of a tariff payment. She explained that
the tariff payment would be higher because TransCanada's
cost of capital was higher than financing the state could
secure on its own. The potential savings was reflected in
the figure of up to $400 million. She reiterated that it
was better to secure cheaper financing at present than to
try to secure financing later when there was a larger check
due to TransCanada and markets knew the project was not
going forward. Additionally, if the project was successful,
the state could finance its midstream costs directly at a
cheaper rate than the rate provided by TransCanada.
3:42:55 PM
Ms. Poduval briefly addressed that the stakes increased as
the project proceeded through the various stage gates. She
reiterated that if the state could secure cheaper financing
on its own, it was better off starting earlier rather than
later.
Ms. Poduval highlighted avoiding TransCanada back-in rights
as the second reason the state should terminate its
agreement with TransCanada at the present time (slide 26).
She detailed that if the state crossed the December 2015
timeline and entered into an FTSA with TransCanada, the
terms of the FTSA specified that if within five years of
terminating TransCanada the state pursues any substantially
similar project, it was required to allow TransCanada an
option to participate under similar terms. She explained
that the legislature had removed the back-in rights
provision from the PA because it wanted to give the state a
clean off-ramp once it had evaluated how the process had
worked through pre-FEED.
Ms. Poduval advanced to slide 27 and relayed that several
key near-term decisions were impending. She stated that
there was a fundamental difference in the interests of the
state, producers, and TransCanada. She elaborated that the
ability for the state to terminate the agreement with
TransCanada and to gain full voting rights equal to its 25
percent share in the project would help the state have a
much more direct influence over key decisions including by-
product handling, project budget, and schedule. Terminating
the agreement with TransCanada was also expected to
facilitate a simpler and more efficient resolution of
voting rights and various terms in the governance
agreements currently under negotiation.
3:45:44 PM
Ms. Poduval indicated she would be skip the next few slides
that had been covered by the finance team the previous day.
Co-Chair Neuman commented that they would return to the
topic covered in the skipped slides at a later time.
Ms. Poduval addressed how the state could replace
TransCanada's technical role in the project. She read from
slide 32 titled "What is TC's technical role in the AKLNG
Project?":
· TC is experienced in northern pipelines and leads the
pipeline technical work for AKLNG
· TC in its current role performs or has performed
several functions including the following:
o Holds State of Alaska's midstream equity in AKLNG
as signatory to the JVA
o Contributes pipeline SMEs that were seconded to
the JVA PMT
o Coordinated FERC NEPA Process
Ms. Poduval addressed slide 33: "How will TransCanada's
technical expertise be replaced?" She relayed that
TransCanada was not anticipated to build the pipeline. She
detailed that the AKLNG Project Management Team (PMT) was
responsible for leading and guiding the project. The team
was comprised of experts from each of the project partners;
the individuals held positions based on their skills and
experience. The PMT hired engineering and specialist
contractors that were currently advancing the project
design efforts; the team would also hire the engineering,
procurement, and construction contractors who would
eventually build the project. She stated that a significant
amount of the work was done by contractors with PMT
oversight.
Ms. Poduval moved to slide 34 and continued to discuss how
TransCanada's technical expertise would be replaced. She
relayed that AGDC had significant Alaska-related pipeline
experience given its successful completion of pre-FEED and
FEED work on the ASAP pipeline. She communicated that AGDC
had already taken over TransCanada's role in coordinating
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) National
Environmental Policy Act process. The AKLNG producer
partners, AGDC, and the contractors would all come together
under the PMT structure to build the GTP, pipeline, and LNG
plant.
3:49:13 PM
Ms. Poduval read from slide 35 titled "Conclusions and
Recommendations":
The current arrangement with TransCanada was designed
to provide the State (and TransCanada) with several
off
different development stages, including an important
clean off-ramp for the State in December 2015
Ms. Poduval added that the clean off-ramp had no back-in
rights for TransCanada. She continued to read from slide
35:
The State administration recommends termination of the
TransCanada relationship by December 2015 and
replacing it with the State's direct participation in
the AKLNG midstream
The exercise of this off
facilitate better alignment and control, lower risk
and create additional value for the State in the AKLNG
Project over the long
Co-Chair Neuman remarked that a substantial amount of
information had been presented. He encouraged members to
submit their questions to the co-chairs.
Ms. Rutherford noted that members' packets included a
document titled "TransCanada AKLNG Participation Decision
Primer" from the Office of the Governor, dated October 24,
2015 (copy on file). She detailed that it was a follow-on
to a Black and Veatch report on the TransCanada
participation decision that had been issued on September
30, 2015. The document was a narrative that provided a
walk-through of the Black and Veatch report and the current
presentation.
Co-Chair Neuman explained that the committee members had
not received the information until shortly before the
current meeting. He asked members to review the information
and ask any questions the following day.
3:52:28 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler asked, under SB 138, who had the
authority to make the termination decision for TransCanada
and where the decision was laid out.
Ms. Rutherford responded that the decision was laid out in
the PA. She noted that the document had been confidential,
but at the administration's request, TransCanada had made
the document public. She believed that TransCanada would
distribute the document within the next 24 hours. The
termination decision was made by the DNR commissioner. She
communicated that the commissioner and governor had felt
strongly that they did not want to terminate the PA without
having the discussion with the legislature in order for the
legislature to become party to the decision and the
associated appropriation. The appropriation would be
mandated by a termination.
Co-Chair Neuman remarked that if the legislature was party
to the decision it should have access to confidentiality
agreements. Ms. Rutherford agreed, which was why the
administration had asked TransCanada to make the PA public.
She noted that a very small portion of the document had
been redacted. She believed the legislature would receive
the information directly from TransCanada.
Co-Chair Neuman asked if the legislature would have access
to all of the confidentiality agreements. Ms. Rutherford
answered that the PA was the confidential document that
drove the arrangement that had emerged from the MOU.
Vice-Chair Saddler referred to the DNR commissioner's
ability to make the termination decision. He asked if it
was a best interest finding. He wondered if the legislature
could get a copy of the finding before making a decision on
appropriating the funds.
Ms. Rutherford replied in the negative. She explained that
it was a contractual arrangement that could be terminated
with "the swipe of a pen."
3:55:10 PM
Representative Wilson agreed that the state should have a
seat at the table. She wondered who would actually sit at
the table on behalf of Alaska. Ms. Rutherford replied that
AGDC would be the state's representative and it would hold
the 25 percent equity position for all three elements of
the project; it currently held the liquefaction portion and
would add the GTP and pipeline.
Representative Wilson assumed the AKLNG partners referred
to on slide 34 were the three producers (i.e. ExxonMobil,
BP, and ConocoPhillips). She surmised that it there would
also be a [state] designee at the table instead of
TransCanada. Ms. Rutherford answered that the state's
representative would be AGDC. She elaborated that AGDC had
been set up by the legislature to be the equity holder at
least for the liquefaction. She furthered that AGDC would
be the state's representative on the project instead of
TransCanada holding the two elements.
Co-Chair Neuman asked where SB 138 gave AKLNG [AGDC]
statutory authority to continue work on the pipeline and
GTP.
Ms. Rutherford stated that the question had also been asked
of the administration earlier in the day. She believed the
attorney general's office would provide a response directly
from the governor's office.
Co-Chair Neuman noted his preference to receive the
information sooner rather than later.
Representative Wilson noted that as part of the partnership
TransCanada would have been paying into PILT [payment in
lieu of taxes] for municipalities. She wondered if it would
go away without TransCanada. Alternatively, she wondered if
the other partners would pay into PILT.
Ms. Rutherford replied that DNR was not the expert on
payment in lieu of taxes. She relayed that she had spoken
with DOR on the issue and she believed the calculation had
been made based on four partners broken into four quarters.
She explained that if the buyout of TransCanada went
through there would be three quarters, but the same amount
of money would be divided among the municipalities; the
municipalities would not have a lower total income
resulting from the TransCanada buyout. She conferred with
Ms. Poduval and noted they had a slight difference of
opinion. She would follow up on the issue with a specific
answer the following day.
3:59:14 PM
Co-Chair Neuman referred to Ms. Rutherford's remark about a
slight difference of opinion on the topic. He wanted to
hear both sides.
Ms. Rutherford noted it [the disagreement] had been between
herself and Ms. Poduval.
Ms. Poduval indicated that each of the producer parties
would continue to pay the PILT, which would not change with
TransCanada's exit.
Representative Guttenberg remarked that if nothing was done
the state would still have the liability for all of the
work done by TransCanada, which would continue. He
furthered that the state would not have the ability to
terminate the project. He asked about the accuracy of his
statements.
Ms. Rutherford responded that the state was responsible for
TransCanada's costs if TransCanada quit, the state
terminated them, or the project terminated. Under the three
circumstances the state would pay TransCanada its costs
plus 7 percent interest or a FTSA could be established,
under which the state would repay TransCanada's costs over
a 20 to 25-year FTSA associated with throughput.
Ms. Poduval added that the state had the right to stop
participating in the AKLNG project; if it chose the option,
TransCanada would no longer incur additional costs on the
state's behalf.
Ms. Rutherford clarified that under the scenario
highlighted by Ms. Poduval, the state would still owe
TransCanada its costs to date plus interest.
Representative Guttenberg discussed that if the state
terminated the agreement with TransCanada, it would owe the
company 7 percent on top [of the money it owed]. He
surmised that the amount would include the cost of capital
TransCanada had accrued. Ms. Poduval agreed that he was
correct.
Representative Guttenberg asked what parameters the state
used to understand what it was paying TransCanada for
(regardless of TransCanada's continued involvement). He
asked if it was a straight billing contract. He asked if
the state was paying for the company's gardener at the
company's headquarters or if the state was paying only
direct costs as opposed to incidental costs. Ms. Rutherford
replied that the subject was part of the PA the legislature
would be receiving from TransCanada [in the near future].
She relayed that the costs were associated with a billing
and the state had audit prerogatives.
4:03:25 PM
Representative Guttenberg referred to slide 4 related to
the state's decision to enter into the PA with TransCanada
[in 2014]. He pointed to the bullet that stated the PA with
TransCanada had given the state time during pre-FEED to
develop its in-house capabilities in order to fully
consider the options of participating directly in midstream
at appropriate off-ramps. He wondered if the state was
there yet. He asked if the capacity had been developed or
if the appropriate people were on board to follow through.
Ms. Rutherford replied in the affirmative. She relayed that
the state had a much better understanding of the
relationship as an equity owner as it had begun to enter
into some of the commercial negotiations and participated
in the project management team oversight of the project.
She believed that AGDC felt very comfortable in holding the
state's equity position.
Representative Gara spoke to two concerns. First, he
addressed whether the state would make more money by
terminating TransCanada. He referred to the estimate that
if the project succeeded the state would make up to $360
million to $400 million per year (without TransCanada),
which was between $3.5 billion and $8 billion in a 20-year
period. He asked if the extra money the state could make
without TransCanada was clear of the original $7.1 billion
investment by the state. He wondered if the state would
earn back the $7.1 billion and make up to $400 million per
year in additional funds. Alternatively, he asked if the
money would go towards paying back the original $7.1
billion investment.
Ms. Poduval answered that the earnings of up to $400
million per year would be net of all of the state's costs;
the funds would be in addition to the repayment of the
state's original $7 billion investment. She elaborated that
the state was expected to borrow the $7 billion and would
have a debt payment obligation during the project's
operation. The additional cash flows of up to $400 million
come after the debt payments had been met.
4:07:48 PM
Representative Gara surmised that the state would receive
$200 million to $400 million [per year] and would not have
to subtract the original $7.1 billion. Ms. Poduval replied
in the affirmative.
Representative Gara discussed a failed project scenario. He
surmised that if the state ended the project at present (he
believed that would be a mistake) and bought out
TransCanada, it would not cost the state any more money
than if the legislature did not pass the bill [HB 3001].
Ms. Poduval responded in the affirmative. She explained
that the state had the obligation to pay back regardless.
Representative Gara asked if it would save the state money
to buyout TransCanada at present in the event of a project
failure in three or four years' time, given that the state
would not continue to pay TransCanada's 7 percent interest
and financing costs.
Ms. Poduval replied in the affirmative. She expounded that
if the project failed in three or four years' time, without
TransCanada the state would be writing a smaller check for
its participation up to that point in time. She furthered
that Black and Veatch believed the state could secure
cheaper financing than TransCanada's 7 percent interest on
pre-FEED and FEED costs.
Representative Gara restated his understanding that if the
project failed, the state would save more money without
TransCanada and if the project succeeded, the state would
earn more money. He asked for the accuracy of his
statement. Ms. Poduval replied in the affirmative, assuming
that the state could finance at a rate below 7 percent.
4:10:24 PM
Co-Chair Thompson asked if there had been any alignment
issues between the state and TransCanada to date. He asked
for detail. Ms. Rutherford replied that the confidentiality
agreement made discussing some of the issues difficult. She
was not able to go into any detail, but there had been some
difficulties because the state and TransCanada had
different commercial perspectives. She added that the
difficulties had not been extreme, but they did exist.
Ms. Poduval provided the access to information as an
example. The area was challenging for the state because
information was provided indirectly through TransCanada.
Co-Chair Neuman wanted to know the problems and issues that
existed. He wondered if the state's relationship with
TransCanada was good or bad and in what areas it was good
or bad.
Ms. Rutherford replied that governance was a good example
of areas where there had been differences of opinion. She
expounded that there was lack of clarity on who would vote
on AKLNG under a split ownership between TransCanada and
AGDC. She elaborated that if AGDC would want the vote if it
was fronting the state's money and participating in the
project. The state would want the vote due to its ownership
in the liquefaction.
Co-Chair Thompson referred to the Black and Veatch report,
which talked about that the state gas team and AGDC were
participants in the regulatory process and commercial
negotiations with the producers. He spoke to project
expansion and third-party access issues and asked who made
up the state gas team and what role the individuals played.
Ms. Rutherford offered to provide a written list of names
of individuals under contract and within the various
agencies.
Co-Chair Thompson requested additional information on how
the individuals interacted with AGDC on the decision making
process. Ms. Rutherford would provide that information.
Co-Chair Neuman asked if there was anything specific that
laid out who the project team members and their duties.
Ms. Rutherford asked for clarification. She questioned
whether he was referring to the AKLNG project or the state
gas team.
Co-Chair Neuman was referring to both. Ms. Rutherford would
provide the information.
4:14:42 PM
Representative Munoz asked whether TransCanada had
fulfilled its obligations in the pre-FEED process. Ms.
Rutherford responded in the affirmative.
Representative Munoz wondered if TransCanada supported
potentially increasing the pipe size from 42-inches to 48-
inches. Ms. Rutherford affirmed that the AKLNG project had
supported the work associated with fully analyzing the
larger pipe as part of the final pre-FEED effort. She noted
that the decision had required all parties to vote in
support of the analysis.
Representative Munoz asked if the financial decision the
legislature would make included the additional money
required of the expansion decision. Ms. Rutherford answered
that it was not a decision, but a commitment by the project
to bring a 48-inch analysis up to the same level of pre-
FEED information as the 42-inch pipeline. The analysis
would enable the project and its equity owners to make an
informed decision on the appropriate pipe size.
Representative Munoz asked about the expected budget for
reviewing the information leading to the decision. Ms.
Rutherford answered that the additional analysis was $30
million.
Representative Munoz asked if the state's portion of the
$30 million was included in the appropriation request in
the bill. Ms. Rutherford replied in the affirmative.
Co-Chair Neuman requested numbers as the meeting continued.
Representative Munoz asked about TransCanada's level of
involvement in the project in terms of its employees
dedicated to the project. She queried how many individuals
from TransCanada were actively working on the project. Ms.
Rutherford believed 15 TransCanada employees were working
on the project.
4:17:58 PM
Representative Munoz asked what would happen to the
relationship with TransCanada if the buyout did not occur
at present. Ms. Rutherford stated that in discussions with
TransCanada, the company had offered to enable its key
employees to continue working on the project through the
pre-FEED stage.
Representative Munoz was curious about the state's
relationship with TransCanada going forward if the buyout
did not occur. She wondered how the decision would impact
forward movement on the project.
Ms. Rutherford believed the legislature would hear from
TransCanada that it was supportive of the buyout. She
believed it was the company's preference. She remarked that
the company would be available for discussion with the
legislature later in the week. She relayed that she had
been told by TransCanada that it was supportive of the
buyout.
Representative Gattis remarked that when SB 138 had been
passed there seemed to be significant value associated with
including TransCanada in the deal. She wanted to know the
downside of losing TransCanada's participation in the
project.
Ms. Rutherford replied that the downside was that the state
did not want to lose any momentum on the pre-FEED work. In
relation to one of the most significant risks, TransCanada
had been obliging by agreeing to either second its
employees to the project or allow the project to hire
TransCanada's employees to finish the work.
4:20:52 PM
Co-Chair Neuman referred to Ms. Poduval's testimony that it
was a good transaction. He remarked that nothing was
perfect. He asked about problems that had arisen or items
she thought were concerns to the state. He relayed that the
committee needed all of the information to understand the
whole story.
Ms. Poduval reiterated there were some constraints due to
confidentiality, but she wanted to help the committee
understand where the misalignments were. She relayed that
access to information was an area that had been challenging
because it came to the state indirectly through
TransCanada. She spoke to by-product handling and the
importance of the state having a direct seat at the table.
She elaborated that there was a substantial amount of CO2
that would need to be extracted from the Prudhoe Bay gas;
it was the expectation that the CO2 would be reinjected in
the Prudhoe Bay unit. There needed to be negotiations about
how the costs associated with the by-product handling would
be negotiated effectively. She continued that it could be
done on a bilateral basis between each of the parties
bringing gas in or the AKLNG project could negotiate with
the Prudhoe Bay unit. From TransCanada's perspective any
cost incurred would be a pass-through to the state in the
form of a tariff. However, from the state's perspective, it
was billions of dollars. She relayed that in the specific
example, the best way to protect the state's interest was
to be there directly.
Co-Chair Neuman asked Ms. Rutherford to provide the
committee with a list of some of the issues the
administration had looked at and how it had weighted the
concerns to the state or TransCanada. Ms. Rutherford
affirmed that she would follow up with the information.
4:23:50 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler referred to his earlier question about
when the termination mechanism would occur. He recalled
that Ms. Rutherford had answered that it was a contractual
provision that could be changed with the stroke of a pen.
He wanted to see the document once it had been signed and
wondered when it would be provided to the committee.
Ms. Rutherford replied that the partnership with
TransCanada had not yet been terminated; no document had
been signed. She relayed that the commissioner of DNR and
the governor believed it was not an appropriate action to
take without the legislature's engagement related to the
appropriation.
Vice-Chair Saddler wondered if the contract would be signed
before the appropriation was made. Ms. Rutherford replied
that the administration would not terminate the PA without
the legislature's approval of the appropriation.
Vice-Chair Saddler surmised that it was putting the cart
before the horse. He believed that only once the
commissioner decided to terminate the contract with
TransCanada did it become the legislature's decision to
appropriate the money or not. Ms. Rutherford replied that
the commissioner could have taken the action to terminate
TransCanada. However, the commissioner did not feel that
obligating the state to approximately $70 million without
having the discussion with the legislature was prudent.
Vice-Chair Saddler asked what would occur if the
legislature declined to vote in support of appropriation.
Ms. Rutherford responded that the administration would
begin to explore the FTSA with TransCanada.
4:26:03 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler referred to Ms. Rutherford's testimony
that TransCanada was willing to make the PA public. He was
anxious to see the document. Ms. Rutherford replied in the
affirmative. She had asked TransCanada to transmit the
document as quickly as possible.
Vice-Chair Saddler queried the project voting mechanism. He
asked whether scenario without TransCanada meant the state
would have one vote out of four instead of one vote out of
five. He wondered how it would materially change the
state's bargaining power.
Ms. Rutherford agreed to provide the information in written
form. She could not remember off hand whether the
information was confidential.
Representative Edgmon remarked that the bill consisted of
two pages. He referred to the $13 million increment
included on page 2 for three state agencies. He noted that
Pat Pitney (director of Office of Management and Budget,
Office of the Governor) had told the committee the previous
day that the money tied to legal contracts and bankability
work. He wondered how it would impact the state's momentum
on the project if the bill failed to pass. He asked for
comments on the importance of the money in terms of the
administration and AGDC.
Ms. Rutherford replied that there were various elements to
the appropriation bill including the buyout of TransCanada;
funding AGDC's ability to pick up its operational costs and
the final pre-FEED costs; and funding for the Department of
Revenue (DOR), the Department of Law (DOL), and the
Department of Natural Resources' (DNR) roles in the
commercial aspects of the negotiations. The commercial
aspects included everything from fiscals (fiscal certainty)
to upstream cost allocations. Additionally, because the
state was not a working interest owner in the Point Thomson
or Prudhoe Bay units, the state needed to ensure it would
have the gas available to sell and supply on a regular
basis. She elaborated that if the state did not receive the
appropriations to finish up the current portion of the
fiscal year, it would greatly affect the state's ability to
continue the negotiations and bring commercial agreements
to the legislature as quickly as possible.
4:30:03 PM
Representative Edgmon surmised that Ms. Rutherford believed
it would be a setback [on the project's momentum if the
bill failed to pass]. Ms. Rutherford replied that it would
be a significant setback. She elaborated that when DNR had
put its budget together for the gas commercialization
efforts, it had requested $13 million and had been funded
slightly under $9 million with the understanding from
various finance members that the department could come back
with a supplemental request if necessary. She relayed that
the increment in the bill represented a supplemental
request for DNR and she believed it was what the other two
agencies were doing as well.
Representative Edgmon queried the length of time the
legislature would have to address the fiscal implications
that would result if the bill failed to pass and the DNR
commissioner elected to terminate TransCanada. He wondered
if the costs would come forward in a supplemental bill.
Ms. Rutherford replied that TransCanada had up to 30 days
to provide the state with a billing, and the state had up
to 90 days to pay the costs plus the 7 percent. She noted
that the state could audit and challenge the costs. After
120 days the interest rate would increase to 10 percent
plus LIBOR [London Interbank Offered Rate]. She noted that
the previous Friday, LIBOR had been 0.182 (approximately
10.2 percent interest after the 120th day).
Ms. Poduval expounded that if TransCanada issued a
termination notice to the state or the commissioner of DNR
chose to terminate, the payment due date would be 30 days
after the notice was provided and 90 days after that the
state would begin incurring a penalty at LIBOR plus 10
percent.
Ms. Rutherford continued that if TransCanada provided a
billing to the state the day after the company had given
termination notice, the 90 days would begin at that time;
120 days was the maximum time period.
Representative Edgmon remarked on the testifiers' earlier
statements that if the bill failed to pass, the
administration would move forward in pursuing the FTSA with
TransCanada. He observed that under that scenario his
questions were not applicable.
4:34:06 PM
Representative Gara referred to discussion about the
possibility of a 48-inch pipe. He recalled that under the
former Parnell Administration that staff (then DNR
Commissioner Joe Balash and DOR Deputy Commissioner Michael
Palowski) had pushed a 48-inch pipe with the caveat that
they felt the state would be able to fill it. He did not
believe in ExxonMobil, BP, and ConocoPhillips
monopolization of the North Slope. He discussed that with a
42-inch pipe there was a certain amount of inexpensive
expansion, but at some point expansion became very
expensive and the state would risk not having competitors
on the North Slope. He asked about the accuracy of his
statement.
Ms. Rutherford replied that a 42-inch pipe would be
expandable, but the administration believed that a 48-inch
pipe would be a superior option for third-party expansion
opportunities on the North Slope. She expounded that the
operational costs for the fuel gas would offset the
additional cost of the pipe within 12 years. Part of the
discussion at the project level was about whether the
premises were true. She furthered that part of the reason
for bringing the 48-inch pipe up to the same level of
information as the 42-inch pipe was to make the
determination with informed information.
Co-Chair Neuman referred to the administration's economics
and noted that there was a breakpoint related to
compression and the amount of money it would cost for
additional compression. He asked Ms. Rutherford to provide
the information to the committee.
Ms. Rutherford agreed to provide that information. She
noted that the information would be based on the analysis
within the gas team and would not be a project
representation. The project would not yet make a
determination on the assumption until the studies had been
completed.
Representative Gara understood that "you wouldn't want to
build a pipe if you didn't think the gas was there." He
appreciated that the issue was being studied. He spoke to a
scenario it was determined that there was sufficient gas to
support a 48-inch pipe plus expansion. Under that scenario,
if the state elected to go with a 42-inch pipe it would
increase the chances that that it only had basin control on
the North Slope with ConocoPhillips, BP, and ExxonMobil.
Additionally, he surmised that it would deter additional
exploration, jobs, revenue, and gas through the pipeline.
He asked if his statements were fair.
Ms. Rutherford agreed that the statements were consistent
with DNR's perspective. She stressed that DNR had always
been an advocate for opening up opportunities for third
parties to develop the gas. The department strongly
believed it was in the state's best interest. The
department also believed that resource owners on the North
Slope would try to "right-size" the pipe for their own
resources. She believed having the tension between the
resource owner wanting to have an upscale pipe or an easily
expandable pipe is a natural and probably healthy
discussion.
4:38:25 PM
Co-Chair Neuman requested any information the
administration had from the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission (AOGCC) on offtake and the effects offtake had
on oil production. Ms. Rutherford agreed to provide that
information. She noted that AOGCC had recently made new
offtake orders for Prudhoe Bay and Point Thomson.
Representative Guttenberg felt that TransCanada had "no
skin in the game." He elaborated that the state reimbursed
TransCanada for every dime spent on the project. He
reasoned that because the company had no risk, downsizing
or changing parameters of the project was not a problem for
the company. He stated that all TransCanada would think
about was how to make more money. He elaborated that if the
project failed the company would be reimbursed and if the
project succeeded there would be more upside. He asked
about the accuracy of his assessment. He wondered if the
administration had made the consideration about the state's
relationship with TransCanada when the company was at the
table voting on the state's behalf or making decisions at
the management team level.
Ms. Poduval agreed with that summation. She furthered that
any costs incurred as part of the project expenses would
eventually be passed through to the state under the current
agreement with TransCanada and the expected FTSA. She
agreed that it was something that influenced the
recommendation and that the state needed to be aware of.
Ms. Poduval clarified that the AKLNG work product and
budget (capital needed to keep the project going) allowed
for the state to influence TransCanada's vote on the
specific area.
Representative Guttenberg queried the difference between
the state terminating the agreement and TransCanada
terminating the agreement. He wondered about the state's
liabilities in each scenario. Ms. Poduval replied that the
issue was covered under the terms of the confidential PA
that TransCanada had agreed to release shortly. She
explained that if TransCanada terminated the agreement, the
state's payment to the company would be due in 30 days. She
detailed that the state would still accrue interest at a
7.1 percent rate during that period. She relayed that if
the state had not made its termination payment within 90
days of the due date, the state would begin accruing
interest at a higher percentage (LIBOR plus 10 percent).
Under a scenario where the state terminated the agreement,
if the state failed to make a payment within 30 days, the
LIBOR plus 10 percent would begin accruing at that point.
Ms. Rutherford disagreed with Ms. Poduval's statement. Ms.
Poduval stated that the lawyers could answer the question.
4:43:08 PM
Co-Chair Neuman requested a chart outlining the dates and
information. Ms. Rutherford agreed to provide the
information.
Representative Wilson wondered why the commissioner of DNR
was not at the table to answer questions.
Co-Chair Neuman invited Commissioner Myers to the table.
Representative Wilson wondered why the commissioner did not
sign off on it [the decision to terminate TransCanada] if
it was in the state's best interest. She remarked that the
legislation had been implemented to take the politics out
of the equation.
4:44:35 PM
MARK MYERS, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
answered that there were several reasons. First, there was
an appropriate time to terminate (December 31, 2015), which
optimized the state's position. He did not want to presume
the termination until he was confident the funds were
available. He detailed that the state would be responsible
for paying additional interest if there was a failure to
fund the termination bill. He believed it was appropriate
to understand whether it was the will of the legislature to
fund or not fund the appropriation. He relayed that the
bill itself did not provide for sufficient funding. He
furthered that because of the last year's budget cycle, the
department did not have sufficient funding to get through
the current [fiscal] year without a supplemental budget.
Additionally, DNR could not fund the work plan and budget,
which was also part of the budget. He noted that DNR would
default on many fronts. He stated that the issue was a
matter of timeliness and appropriateness of process and was
out of respect for the legislature's position as the
appropriation body. Secondly, the decision to terminate
TransCanada was a judgement call in the end. He believed
the pros and cons had been accurately laid out. He stated
that the decision made significant sense on an NPV basis.
He elaborated that the value to the state had been
presented. Additionally, the administration had shown the
non-direct financial value of the decision, which included
increased authority for the state. He believed it was the
right decision and a good one.
Commissioner Myers relayed that the relationship with
TransCanada had been developing over time. The company's
willingness or desire for termination had recently become
apparent. He stated that for multiple reasons it was
apparent that the termination was the best decision to
make. He stressed that from a timely standpoint, it was a
decision to make on December 31, 2015 in order to optimize
its value to the state. He reiterated that if the funding
was not in place, the state would incur a significant
liability and additional penalties and payments because
there was no funding mechanism until the regular session
[beginning in January 2016], which would lead to a point of
paying extra interest.
Representative Wilson remarked that the administration
could have limited the request to the funding. She stressed
the importance of keeping politics out of the decision. She
believed the project should be run as a business. She
addressed a scenario where TransCanada was terminated and
AGDC replaced the company's responsibilities going forward.
She asked for verification that the legislature's only
involvement would be to decide whether or not to fund the
next project stages. She assumed AGDC would come to the
legislature (when a stage had been completed) with a
request for funds to move forward. She asked for
verification that the legislature would not be asked to
make decisions on project partners and what would occur
next.
Commissioner Myer affirmed that her statements were correct
with respect to the pipeline and the engineering design and
construction process. There were a series of other
decisions that were necessary including the royalty in kind
(RIK) election, terms, governance issues, and other. Most
of the items were with the administration and in
negotiation. There were also decisions to be made by the
sponsors group on a continual basis through the pre-FEED
process.
4:48:33 PM
Representative Wilson asked for confirmation that AGDC
would be the state's representative on the project if the
legislation was passed. Ms. Rutherford replied
affirmatively that on all of the project pieces AGDC would
have the discussion about funding along with the executive
on moving into FEED, FID, and other related issues. She
relayed that the commercial agreements associated with
fiscals and royalties would go through the executive and
the associated contracts would be brought to the
legislature.
Co-Chair Neuman clarified that legislators in the audience
could submit questions to the chairs.
Vice-Chair Saddler appreciated hearing the administration's
respect for the roles of the executive branch and the
legislature. He believed it was important to respect the
separation of powers. He detailed that it was the DNR
commissioner's responsibility to make the decision and
request funding from the legislature. He stated that the
current special session had been called to discuss the
termination of the state's partnership with TransCanada. He
referred to testimony from Ms. Rutherford that the
administration had experienced some disagreements with
TransCanada. He believed it was important to understand how
well the process laid out in SB 138 had been pursued before
a decision was made on making changes. He asked how often
the administration's team had met with TransCanada to work
on project issues. He queried TransCanada's involvement
with the administration over the past 10 months.
Ms. Rutherford stated that TransCanada had been very
involved in all of the project aspects in its role on the
project management team. However, they were not privy to
some of the commercial marketing discussions because they
were not involved in the upstream gas supply or the
sovereign's decisions on fiscals. There had been some
discussions on FTSA between the administration and
TransCanada that had started in December [2014], which had
continued off and on through June [2015]. She the
administration had begun to move towards a termination
decision once it had become more aware of some of the
difficulties with information and as governance tensions
began to develop related to recognition that a split
ownership would be difficult. She did not know the precise
number of meetings that had occurred, but she thought they
may have been weekly.
4:52:58 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler wondered when the administration had
made the decision to move towards the termination of
TransCanada. Ms. Rutherford did not recall a specific date.
As the administration had begun to look at the economics of
the decision, information flow, and governance questions it
had developed a general recognition that it was more in the
state's interest to have the state hold its own equity
instead of having an agent in the middle.
Vice-Chair Saddler asked that she specify a month. Ms.
Rutherford deferred the question to Commissioner Myers.
Commissioner Myers replied that with a new administration
it had taken time for the new commissioners to fully
understand the economics of the project. Additionally, the
LNG market had been changing. One of the things the
administration had looked at with the help of Black and
Veatch an others was how to protect the state's downside.
Due to the volatility and changes in the gas market, the
administration recognized that models and predictions about
oil price-linked LNG pricing were not as robust as was
hoped. He did not believe anyone had been modelling oil-
linked pricing at less than $70 per barrel. He relayed that
maximizing value for the state had become very critical
when looking at the Pacific Rim market and the significant
volatility. Subsequently, when the administration had
looked at all of the places it could maximize value in
terms of netting back a higher wellhead value, the issue at
hand had come up as a prime area where significant value to
the state resided. When the administration had done the
analysis of the TransCanada structure, it felt that the
state was taking additional risk by not buying out the
company and was losing upside that could protect the state
particularly in a lower price environment. The major reason
for his decision on the recommendation to terminate
TransCanada was due to increased economic value to the
state and lowering its risk during low return price cycles.
He stated that the decision had been an evolving process as
the new administration had worked through the data. The
communications issues had been present at various times,
much of which depended on the timing of AKLNG management
committee meetings. He reiterated that the reason the
administration had come forward with the recommendation was
its belief that the state was better off economically on
the project and was more protected, particularly under the
lower priced oil and gas environment.
4:56:30 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler recalled that oil price had been
dropping even before the new administration had taken
office in the past year. He surmised that there had to have
been a specific point when the administration had
determined that TransCanada should be terminated from the
project. He wondered if the timing could be narrowed down
to a specific month or so.
Commissioner Myers replied that it had occurred during the
past summer [2015]. He discussed that after looking at and
understanding the market volatility there had been
significant internal research on competitive projects and
at the idea of whether future LNG prices would be linked to
oil. He referred to Henry Hub [U.S. oil pricing company]
and stated that the administration was learning much more
about the state's commercial competition, which had been an
evolving process. At the start of the past summer, he
believed that the whole industry was looking at whether a
longer-term systematic change was occurring. To maximize
the state's competitiveness, given the values, the decision
had become increasingly more important. He estimated that
the administration had the data in June or July. He
referred to other data as well. He reiterated that it was
difficult to find a case in which the termination was not
in the state's best interest.
4:58:19 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler asked how much work needed to be done to
be done on the FTSA if TransCanada was not terminated from
the project. He wondered if the timeline of next December
would be met. Ms. Rutherford believed the FTSA could be
completed within a couple of weeks.
Co-Chair Neuman asked about the risk assessments. He
wondered about the risk assessment method of analysis
related to terminating or staying with TransCanada.
Commissioner Myers answered that the administration had
discussions with the LNG team that had been developing the
assessment (primarily led by ExxonMobil) and was aware that
TransCanada secondees were very important to the project.
Additionally, the administration was aware that the
governance had not progressed as quickly as the state had
hoped. The administration wanted to know who the operators
of the various components would be. He relayed that if
TransCanada seconded employees into the project it would
allow for a smooth transition. He wanted to be careful to
avoid discussing any confidential information. He noted
that a project operator had not been announced for each of
the components. He relayed that the governance pieces had
to be finalized. He stated that if TransCanada had been
chosen as the operator, the situation may be different. He
stated that it was early enough in the project for
successful transition to occur. He remarked that
TransCanada was a great company.
5:01:16 PM
Co-Chair Neuman asked whether there had been any discussion
about the other partners in the project when the analysis
had been done on whether or not to separate from
TransCanada. He asked if the risk to the other partners was
impacted with the removal of TransCanada.
Ms. Rutherford replied that the administration had asked
the AKLNG partners. The partners had relayed that they had
no preference and the decision was up to the state. She
added that the partners had consistently been very specific
on the issue.
Representative Kawasaki remarked that every version of SB
138 or HB 277 [similar gasline legislation introduced by
the governor in 2014] had envisioned a time where the state
would have the ability to make the decision at hand. He
furthered that the new administration had to figure out
whether it was the best course of action. He compared the
situation to a divorce or dissolution. He was concerned
about having a partner that was not "gung-ho" about the
relationship.
Ms. Rutherford replied that it was better for TransCanada
to speak on its own behalf. However, she relayed that the
company had been very clear that it was acceptable for the
state to discuss that TransCanada also wanted to end the
relationship.
Representative Kawasaki expressed discomfort at the
situation. He asked if the administration was concerned
that TransCanada would pull out from the PA at a certain
time. Ms. Rutherford agreed that it had always been a
possibility, which would remain if TransCanada was not
terminated at present. She believed it was a fair concern.
5:04:00 PM
Representative Kawasaki remarked that the project could be
several years down the road and several hundred million
dollars invested; knowing that the partner had been willing
for disillusion seemed like a costly gamble.
Ms. Rutherford agreed and believed that financial groups
had spoken to the issue the previous day. She reasoned that
it was a risk moving forward if the state did not buy
TransCanada out at present.
Co-Chair Thompson asked where the process had deviated from
SB 138 related to timeframe. He queried deadlines proposed
in the HOA that had not been met. He wondered if there had
been any conversation about moving the December 31, 2015
deadline to July 31, 2016 in order to get things in line
and to help TransCanada feel that the state was being more
cooperative.
Ms. Rutherford replied that she did not recall if there
were any agreements within the HOA that had been missed.
She relayed that the department was currently looking into
the issue in response to an earlier question from the
Senate. She hoped to have the information for the committee
later in the day or the following morning. She did not
believe any deadlines had been missed. She added that it
had always been the hope that the commercial agreements
would be in place prior to entering into a FTSA; it made it
more difficult because the agreements were not yet
available.
Co-Chair Neuman for a written status report of the
negotiations. Ms. Rutherford answered in the affirmative.
Co-Chair Thompson asked, in TransCanada's absence, who
would be responsible for engineering and commercial work on
future pipeline expansion to accommodate gas not owned by
the producers (e.g. gas in the Nenana Basin). He wanted to
know who would be doing the engineering.
Ms. Rutherford responded that it would be the
responsibility of the project. She elaborated that the
project would be operating the pipeline; there had been no
decisions made yet on whether it would be governed as an
integrated project or have operators for each segment (the
GTP, pipeline, and liquefaction). There were currently
discussions being held on the commercial level about under
what terms the project would have to address third-party
access and expansion demands.
Co-Chair Thompson asked who would own the infrastructure to
monetize the gas of a partner that withdrew from the
project. He wondered if the financial burden would fall on
the state. He asked if the scenario would be different if
TransCanada remained in the project.
Ms. Poduval responded that if one of the producers withdrew
from the project, it would fall upon the remaining AKLNG
parties (the two remaining producers and the state) to
evaluate the options to move the project forward. She noted
that there would be a financial side. Additionally, the
three producers control the gas on the North Slope; it
would be necessary to determine how the continuing project
would have access to the gas. It would be necessary for a
decision to be made by the three remaining parties on
whether to pick up the exiting parties portion of the
project or to bring in another partner.
5:09:26 PM
Ms. Rutherford added that under the scenario it made no
difference whether TransCanada was the state's agent on the
pipeline or the GTP because the project itself would still
be dealing with the withdrawal of a partner. She relayed
that it was one of the reasons Governor Walker felt so
strongly about having commitments from the producers that
should they withdraw there would be a provision for making
the gas available. She spoke to the critical nature of the
issue and communicated that volumes made a huge difference
on the cost of the supply and the economics of the overall
AKLNG project.
Co-Chair Thompson thought it would make sense for
TransCanada to take on and purchase the gas from the
withdrawing party. He surmised that it could be a costly
undertaking for the state to take on the responsibility. He
added that the other partners may not be interested.
Commissioner Myers replied that TransCanada was a pipeline
operation company and did not sell or market gas. He
followed up on Co-Chair Thompson's question related to
expansion of other gas. He relayed that it was one of the
reasons the state wanted a 48-inch pipeline; it was easier
to expand on a base load. Additionally, it required fewer
compressor stations and provided significantly more
available capacity within the pipe. He stated that things
like the Nenana Basin could be handled a number of
different ways, but the state wanted to assure that there
was capacity for the issues. He furthered that the
consideration of an intake point on the Nenana Basin would
be looked at along with the off-take points in Fairbanks
and other locations. He added that AGDC had the off-take
responsibility. Additionally, the commercial side that the
state was working to ensure that the project expansion
terms were favorable to enable other parties to bring gas
in. Under the current FERC regulation for an LNG project
there was not an assured, easy expansion route. He relayed
that it was one of the major negotiation issues to assure
the project terms included language supporting the concept.
He remarked that from the standpoint of a producer with gas
in two large fields, any additional gas would be
competition. However, the state had a desire to see
additional gas (from the state, Doyon, or other).
5:12:41 PM
Co-Chair Thompson referenced that the department had
mentioned the attorney general would be providing the
legislature with a decision on AGDC's statutory authority
to take on the lead for the GTP and pipe. Ms. Rutherford
believed the information would be completed by the
following day. She noted that based on language she had
looked at, she believed the authority currently resided in
AGDC.
Representative Gattis referenced the timeline that state
would have to pay TransCanada [if the buyout occurred]. She
addressed billing and auditing. She asked if it would take
longer than 120 days for the state to go through all of
TransCanada's bills to audit. She wondered if the state was
current with its auditing or if it would have to backtrack
and spend months working the issue out.
Ms. Rutherford replied that she wanted to discuss the
question with DOR. She relayed that an answer would be
provided in writing. She believed there were provisions to
accommodate any challenges to TransCanada's billings that
would not negatively affect the state's payment
responsibilities.
Co-Chair Neuman referred to slide 6 that addressed off-
ramps and termination clauses provided by SB 138 for
TransCanada. He wanted to know the state's option for
exiting the project including the costs and liabilities.
Ms. Poduval responded that the state and TransCanada both
had the option of terminating the PA. The December 2015
clean off-ramp was available to both parties. Additionally,
each party would have the off-ramps available going through
December 2018.
Co-Chair Neuman asked if the state had the same options and
off-ramps for termination as TransCanada. Ms. Poduval
replied in the affirmative. She noted that the PA included
slightly different conditions that trigger termination, but
both parties had the ability to terminate the PA.
Co-Chair Neuman asked about the administration's "plan B."
He wondered what would occur if HB 3001 failed to pass. Ms.
Poduval replied that if TransCanada's termination was not
possible, the state would negotiate and execute the FTSA.
5:16:45 PM
Co-Chair Neuman asked what the FTSA process would involve.
Ms. Poduval replied that the state would negotiate the
terms of a long-term (20 to 25 years) FTSA with
TransCanada; the state and TransCanada would agree on the
tariff the state would pay. TransCanada would be obligated
to provide the service to the state and the state would be
obligated to make the payments for the services during the
project's operation.
Co-Chair Neuman provided a scenario where the legislation
did not pass, the state did not spend another $160 million,
TransCanada and the other producers continued to build a
pipeline. He remarked that the risk to the state would be
minimal. He needed further clarity on the issue.
Ms. Poduval referred to slide 19 showing where the state
would be from a cash flow perspective. She explained that
the blue line delineated the path in which the state
terminated its agreement with TransCanada and took
ownership in the GTP and pipeline. The green line
represented maintained its partnership with TransCanada and
entered into an FTSA. The slide indicated that the state
would achieve lower revenues (up to $400 million less) if
the state continued the partnership with TransCanada.
Co-Chair Neuman asked for the baseline methodology. Ms.
Poduval confirmed that the information could be provided.
Ms. Poduval clarified her response to an earlier question
from Representative Gara about whether the $400 million per
year would be a net benefit of all of the costs and
investment that the state would make in the project. She
pointed out that the assumption behind the $360 million was
that the state would finance its $7 billion with 30 percent
equity and 70 percent debt; there would be a $2 billion
upfront equity investment in the project. She furthered
that the net effect was shown in the table on slide 19; the
state would still come out at $5 billion more [than it
would with TransCanada].
Ms. Rutherford relayed that the administration had made
Black and Veatch available to work with enalytica (the
legislature's consultant) to ensure enalytica had complete
access to the administration's modelling and the premises
that went into the modelling.
Commissioner Myers added that there were five parties
currently in the project and any of the parties were able
to terminate the project at any point in time. He was not
forecasting that any party would terminate, but there would
be more project surety for the state with four parties
rather than five.
5:20:12 PM
Co-Chair Neuman returned to slide 6. He discussed the
option available to TransCanada to exit the agreement. He
listed items that would take place as a result. He referred
to the department's testimony that the state would have the
same opportunities as TransCanada. He wondered if the state
chose to exit the project, whether it would have the
opportunity in five years to enter back into the project.
Commissioner Myers reported that the project would stop if
the state failed to sign the work plan and budget.
Ms. Rutherford added that the state and TransCanada had the
right to terminate up until FID. After December 31, 2015,
even after the FTSA was in place, if at any time the AKLNG
project terminated and the state began pursuing a similar
project, TransCanada would have a back-in right back into
the project.
Co-Chair Neuman asked if the state had the same right. He
remarked that the department had testified that the state
had the same rights as TransCanada.
Ms. Rutherford replied that she must have misspoken. She
clarified that the state could not force TransCanada to
remain in the project.
Co-Chair Neuman restated his question. He asked if the
state would have the same ability to buy back into the
project. Ms. Rutherford explained that TransCanada had no
separate prerogative associated with AKLNG from the State
of Alaska. TransCanada was simply the state's agent on two
segments of the project.
Co-Chair Neuman would follow up on the question at a later
time.
5:22:38 PM
Co-Chair Neuman referred to 26 titled "Avoid Back-In Rights
for TransCanada." He wondered if the state had the same
right to buy back into to a project within five years. Ms.
Poduval explained that the back-in right related
specifically to the relationship between the state and
TransCanada and the ability the state had given TransCanada
to take its 25 percent in the GTP and pipeline. She relayed
that if the state chose to terminate the relationship with
TransCanada after December 31, 2015 and the state chose to
pursue a substantially similar project, TransCanada would
have the right to come back into the project. She surmised
that he was asking if the state terminated the relationship
with TransCanada whether the state could come back into the
project or bring TransCanada in. She believed the state
could bring TransCanada in, but the state would already be
in the project. She explained that if the state was not in
the AKLNG project, the project would likely be terminated.
Ms. Rutherford attempted to restate Co-Chair Neuman's
question. She believed he may be asking whether the state
would have the same back-in rights if TransCanada
independently began to pursue an alternative project in the
State of Alaska with producers. She did not believe the
state had the same right.
Co-Chair Neuman discussed that through the exercise on SB
138 (the enabling legislation that continued the AKLNG
project), nothing that was done could be perfect. He
furthered that there were things that arose throughout the
process that may not be the best thing for the state, but
they were specified in SB 138. He wondered if the state had
a plan B. He wondered what options the state would want to
include in plan B legislation if things did not work out.
For example, he asked if there was a plan if the governor
wanted to introduce a bill that better protected the
state's rights. He asked about opportunities.
Ms. Rutherford replied that if TransCanada chose to
terminate with the state, the plan B was embedded in SB
138. The plan was for AGCD to pick up the role currently
held by TransCanada, which was exactly what the
administration was suggesting should be done.
Co-Chair Neuman stated that there was still a question
about whether AGDC had statutory authority to fill the
role. Ms. Rutherford agreed and stated that the
administration would provide the answer to the committee.
Co-Chair Neuman wondered what would occur if it was
determined that AGDC did not have the statutory authority
to take over the role. He asked what plan B was. Ms.
Rutherford responded that plan B was to pursue the FTSA
with TransCanada.
5:26:47 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler wondered about an analysis of what
TransCanada brought to the project outside of the financial
advantages. He pointed to information provided about net
cash flow advantages and others, but he observed that the
success of the AKLNG project was as likely with
TransCanada's involvement as without. He asked if the
chances of getting to FID (excluding the financial
advantages) were stronger without TransCanada.
Commissioner Myers replied that it would be appropriate for
TransCanada to address the question about what it desired.
He stated that TransCanada was a world-class pipeline
company; other world-class pipeline companies also existed.
He agreed that TransCanada certainly brought value to the
project. Whether TransCanada would be better than Enbridge
or one of the producers' pipeline companies, was a value
judgement. Ultimately, the operator of the system had not
yet been determined; the determination was part of the
governance decision. He agreed that there were valuable
TransCanada employees seconded to the project; the project
was working on maintaining continuity going forward. There
were two pieces: 1) who would be responsible for designing
and building the pipeline; and 2) who the state's agent for
the pipeline would be. The administration's proposal in the
bill was that AGDC would be the state's agent, but not the
pipeline operator. He stated that the project had to define
the operators after the engineering design work was
completed.
Ms. Rutherford added that the contract developer had also
not yet been determined. She remarked that it was quite
possible that the project would not chose TransCanada to be
the contract developer even if TransCanada remained in the
project as the state's agent on the equity components.
5:29:48 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler understood that the project was a
process. His goal was to reach FID. He stated that if
TransCanada helped to bring the state integrity and
credibility with its partners, he saw a continued advantage
to maintaining the partnership. He requested to see any
evidence showing that it was not the case.
Ms. Poduval replied that the AKLNG partners were deeply
vested in maximizing the likelihood of the project's
success. The partners had communicated their neutral stance
on whether or not TransCanada stayed in the project. The
stance indicated that the partners believed the technical
capabilities needed to continue the project forward would
still be available from the remaining partners and
contractors.
Co-Chair Neuman noted that Ms. Rutherford had mentioned
that AGDC's statutory authority to represent the state on
the pipeline and the GTP was in question. He believed SB
138 allowed AGDC to represent the state in the gas
liquefaction facility only. He discussed that TransCanada
had the ability to leave the project. He remarked that Ms.
Rutherford had stated that TransCanada wanted out of the
project. He wanted to know about plan B. He restated his
earlier questions about whether the governor would
introduce another piece of legislation asking the
legislature to provide AGDC with the authority to represent
the state on the additional components.
Ms. Rutherford clarified that she did not believe there was
a question on AGDC's authority. She relayed that the
question had been asked of the administration; therefore
DOL was looking into the issue and would provide an answer.
She did not believe the administration had questioned
AGDC's authority. Secondly, she did not believe she had
stated that TransCanada had said it wanted out of the
project. She relayed that the company would be able to
speak for itself, but it had specified that it was
supportive of the appropriation in the bill. The
administration's presumption was that if for some reason
the appropriation was not funded, the project would
continue with TransCanada. She had not heard the company
say categorically that they would leave the project; it was
a question the legislature needed to put to the company.
Co-Chair Neuman shared his understanding that TransCanada
had "represented the fact that they would like to get out
of this deal now." He believed that Ms. Rutherford had
stated earlier that TransCanada would like out of the
project.
Ms. Rutherford replied that TransCanada would like the
termination to be funded, but she had no certainty that the
company would chose to leave the state if the appropriation
was not funded. She stated that the company had never said
those words to her or the commissioner.
5:34:32 PM
Representative Gara stated that there had been some
questions about when the administration had arrived at the
decision that it was in the state's best interest to
continue forward without TransCanada. He addressed Ms.
Poduval. He stated that she had shared her conclusions that
if the pipeline moved ahead the state would make more money
without TransCanada and if the project failed the state
would lose less money without TransCanada. He asked for
verification that she had made the same analysis for the
former Parnell Administration as well.
Ms. Poduval replied in the affirmative.
Representative Gara asked for verification that Ms. Poduval
would not have altered her conclusion that the state was
better off without TransCanada if she was still working for
the Parnell Administration. Ms. Poduval replied that the
fundamental economic tradeoff had always been known. The
analysis in the current report was very similar to the
analysis it had provided for SB 138. She affirmed that her
answer was still the same.
Representative Gara indicated he would be uncomfortable
with the project if the state spent $7.1 billion on
building a pipeline and could not find a customer. He
stated that no pipeline owner spent all of the money to
build a pipeline until they had someone to sell and buy the
gas at a price that was high enough to make money for all
project partners. He asked if his statements were accurate.
Ms. Poduval replied in the affirmative. She believed the
factors were compounded in an LNG project even more than in
a pipeline project. She explained that LNG projects were
inherently very capital intensive; the projects paid back
the capital through long-term cash flows. She furthered
that after going through pre-FEED and FEED all of the
important uncertainties had been sketched out. She referred
to the magnitude of the project costs of $45 billion to $65
billion. She stated that at that point the project partners
had sketched out the engineering details, had worked the
financial community to reduce their cost of capital, and
most importantly they had acquired buyers for the LNG who
were willing to commit over the long-term at a price that
would most likely be indexed to oil price. All of the
components had to come to fruition prior to any of the
parties taking FID, which would be board approved. She
agreed that it would not be speculative in the least.
5:39:03 PM
Representative Gara mentioned referred to an earlier
question about the decision to remove TransCanada from the
project and the decision about whether to build a 42-inch
or 48-inch pipe. He stated that the questions had clearly
been envisioned when SB 138 had passed. He recalled the
recommendations from former DOR Deputy Commissioner
Pawlowski that the administration was planning to try to
make a 48-inch pipe feasible because it was in the state's
best interest if the gas was available. Additionally, the
former administration had planned to analyze whether it was
in the state's best interest to remove TransCanada from the
project. He did not believe there was anything in the
current bill that violated or departed from the
fundamentals in SB 138. He asked for verification that the
considerations were all consistent with SB 138. He believed
the questions considered in the legislation were the exact
questions the state was supposed to address prior to
December 15, 2015.
Ms. Poduval answered in the affirmative. She explained that
the PA was designed to have the off-ramps and it was the
legislature that had included the clean off-ramp provision.
The legislature had determined that it did not want any
back-in rights and that the state needed the right to get
to the juncture and decide whether it wanted to keep
TransCanada in or not. She stated that it had been very
much part of the plan to reach the decision point.
Additionally, starting with the former Parnell
Administration the state had been consistent in expressing
its preference for a 48-inch pipeline; the position was not
new. She noted that she had been part of some of the
discussions.
5:41:11 PM
Co-Chair Neuman addressed that there had been a
considerable amount of discussion on legal counsel for the
representation of the state during work on SB 138. At the
time it had been decided that the attorney general's office
would act as legal counsel for the state on the issue. He
suspected that legal counsel may have given different
options. He wondered Commissioner Myers encountered any
specific conclusions where there had been a question about
legal interpretations on SB 138 (where an independent legal
counsel may have come up with different conclusions).
Commissioner Myers replied that he had been pleased with
the legal support provided by DOL. He referred to
contracted attorneys from Greenberg Traurig LLP and
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP working on the state's
behalf. He stated that it was a significant amount of
money, but there was a great discussion due to the multiple
viewpoints. He believed getting a good legal interpretation
from many different attorneys was very valuable. He
remarked that the legal components of SB 138 were well-
spelled out. Getting the timing of the commercial pieces
together in the right order with all of the parties was one
of the challenges. He furthered that at any given time the
companies' economics were different; they had competing
interests themselves. He stated that the alignment and the
arm wrestling of the commercial negotiations had been the
biggest challenge. He noted that it took a long time for
the number of parties and the number of different views. He
spoke to his experience working in the upstream segment of
the industry and in the early stages of the development of
the Kuparuk [oil] field; he had witnessed the arm wrestling
of the companies over very small issues in terms of
internal equity. He reasoned that it was not uncommon for
companies to take a long time to make a complex commercial
arrangement, particularly when their equities were not
equal between the two fields. He stated that it was a tough
negotiation. He did not believe SB 138 had contemplated the
timeframe. He explained that the biggest thing he had seen
was not differing legal opinions, but bringing commercial
alignment among parties in a challenging economic time.
Additionally, robust resources were needed, which was the
reason for the significant budget request for DOL in HB
3001. He believed the state was getting very good legal
advice, but it needed DOL and the consultants.
5:44:29 PM
Vice-Chair Saddler agreed that the decisions before the
committee had been envisioned in SB 138; however, the
critical information that was to have been available to the
legislature and the work that should have been done prior
to the decision point had not been provided. He stated that
the SB 138 process had envisioned that the legislature
would gather in special session to consider a completed
FTSA, royalty modification contracts, gas balancing,
marketing contracts, and the PILT decision. He stressed
that the information was essential to give the legislature
the ability to make an informed decision about whether or
not to buyout TransCanada. He stated that the decision to
terminate resided with the commissioner of DNR. He did not
understand the reluctance to make the decision; he believed
he decision would allow the process to proceed in the
proper sequence.
Co-Chair Neuman remarked that the meeting represented the
committee's first delve into the "meat and potatoes" of the
discussion. He noted the importance of the discussion.
Representative Wilson asked for verification that statute
under SB 138 did not specify the size of the pipe. Ms.
Poduval replied that the statute did not specify the size
of the pipe. She detailed that the decision would be taken
by the AKLNG project team. The statute did include a
requirement for the study and report the legislature on a
larger diameter pipeline. Representative Wilson thanked Ms.
Poduval for the clarification. She had previously thought
that it did [contain a provision specifying the size of the
pipe].
Co-Chair Neuman noted that all members of the legislature
could provide their questions through the co-chairs.
Co-Chair Neuman asked Ms. Rutherford if she wanted to go
through the participation decision primer ["TransCanada
AKLNG Participation Decision Primer" (copy on file)] the
following day. Ms. Rutherford replied in the negative. The
document was a narrative describing the findings of the
Black and Veatch report. She would be glad to answer any
questions that arose related to the document.
Co-Chair Neuman requested an executive summary on SB 138.
Ms. Rutherford agreed to provide that information.
HB 3001 was HEARD and HELD in committee for further
consideration.
Co-Chair Neuman discussed the agenda for the following day.
ADJOURNMENT
5:47:59 PM
The meeting was adjourned at 5:47 p.m.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| TransCanada Participation Decision Presentation PPT 10.25.pdf |
HFIN 10/25/2015 3:00:00 PM |
HB3001 |
| Black&Veatch TC_Participation_Report.pdf |
HFIN 10/25/2015 3:00:00 PM |
HB3001 |
| enalytica, TransCanada Report, October 2015.pdf |
HFIN 10/25/2015 3:00:00 PM |
HB3001 |
| TransCanada Participation Primer 10-24-15.pdf |
HFIN 10/25/2015 3:00:00 PM |
HB3001 |
| HB 3001 Responses 10.25.15 House Finance 3pm Questions Answers.pdf |
HFIN 10/25/2015 3:00:00 PM |
HB3001 |